Assessing the Impact of Tax and Transfer Policies on Labour Supply: A Survey by Bernard Fortin & Guy Lacroix
Ce document a été produit dans le cadre d’une entente entre






   2002RP-10
Assessing the Impact of Tax
and Transfer Policies on
Labour Supply: A Survey
Bernard Fortin and Guy LacroixCIRANO
Le CIRANO est un organisme sans but lucratif constitué en vertu de la Loi des compagnies du Québec. Le
financement de son infrastructure et de ses activités de recherche provient des cotisations de ses organisations-
membres, d’une subvention d’infrastructure du ministère de la Recherche, de la Science et de la Technologie, de
même que des subventions et mandats obtenus par ses équipes de recherche.
CIRANO is a private non-profit organization incorporated under the Québec Companies Act. Its infrastructure and
research activities are funded through fees paid by member organizations, an infrastructure grant from the
Ministère de la Recherche, de la Science et de la Technologie, and grants and research mandates obtained by its
research teams.
Les organisations-partenaires / The Partner Organizations
•École des Hautes Études Commerciales
•École Polytechnique de Montréal
•Université Concordia
•Université de Montréal
•Université du Québec à Montréal
•Université Laval
•Université McGill





•Banque Laurentienne du Canada
•Banque Nationale du Canada




•Développement des ressources humaines Canada (DRHC)
•Fédération des caisses Desjardins du Québec
•Hydro-Québec
•Industrie Canada
•Pratt & Whitney Canada Inc.
•Raymond Chabot Grant Thornton
•Ville de Montréal
© 2002 Bernard Fortin et Guy Lacroix. Tous droits réservés. All rights reserved. Reproduction partielle permise
avec citation du document source, incluant la notice ©.
Short sections may be quoted without explicit permission, if full credit, including © notice, is given to the source.
ISSN 1499-8610Assessing the Impact of Tax and Transfer Policies
on Labour Supply: A Survey
*
Bernard Fortin




Changes in parameters of tax and transfer programs can induce
individuals to alter their behaviour in a wide variety of ways, including
changes in labour supply, in the nature of employee compensation, in the
choice of working in the underground economy, in savings decisions, in human
capital investments and in fertility decisions. The magnitude of these responses
is of critical importance in the formulation of adequate tax and transfer
policies. Thus the behavioural effects of income taxes and those implicit in
means-tested transfer programs may strongly influence the impact of these
policies on income, tax receipts, budgetary costs and welfare. In this paper, we
abide with the tradition of evaluating the impact of tax and transfer programs
on labour supply at both the extensive (the decision to work or not) and the
intensive margins (the number of hours worked). We provide both a theoretical
and empirical survey of the labour supply impact of tax and transfer programs.
An important part of the empirical results discussed in this paper focuses on the
labour supply impact of tax and transfer reforms that occurred in the US, in the
UK and in Canada.
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21 Introduction
Changes in parameters of tax and transfer programs can induce individuals to alter their be-
haviour in a wide variety of ways, including changes in labour supply, in the nature of em-
ployee compensation, in the choice of working in the underground economy, in savings de-
cisions, in human capital investments and in fertility decisions. The magnitude of these re-
sponses is of critical importance in the formulation of adequate tax and transfer policies. Thus
the behavioural effects of income taxes and those implicit in means-tested transfer programs
may strongly inﬂuence the impact of these policies on income, tax receipts, budgetary costs
and welfare.
In principle, a proper evaluation of tax and transfer programs would require a full interac-
tiveanalysis of their numerous effectsonindividualbehaviour. However,giventhecomplexity
of such an undertaking, almost all studies focus on a single effect. In particular, much of the
literature has dealt with the impact of these policies on labour supply. There are at least three
reasons that explain why labour supply has been the major focus of most analyses. First,
recent reforms in tax and transfer programs often aim at stimulating employment and hours
work of targeted groups. For instance, the potentially large disincentive effects induced by
the high implicit tax rates of many social programs have come under severe criticism in re-
cent years. Second, labour resources represent the most important input into the production of
goods and services in the economy. Small variations in total labour supply may therefore have
a signiﬁcant impact on the level of aggregate output. Third, hours of work and labour force
participation are easily measured and well understood concepts thus easing estimation and
interpretation of relevant elasticities. This is probably why very few studies have attempted
to estimate the impact of tax and transfer parameters on “work effort”. The quality of labour
offered on the job is much more difﬁcult to conceptualize and thus to measure.
In this paper, we abide with the tradition of evaluating the impact of tax and transfer
programs on labour supply at both at the extensive (the decision to work or not) and the
intensivemargins (the number of hours worked).1 We provide both a theoretical and empirical
survey of the labour supply impact of tax and transfer programs. An important part of the
empiricalresultsdiscussedinthis paperfocuseson thelaboursupplyimpactof taxand transfer
reforms that occurred in the US, in the UK and in Canada.
Section 2 provides the theoretical framework used to analyze the effect of tax and transfer
programs on the decision to work and on hours of work. We start with the standard labour sup-
ply model and we extend it to take into account taxation and social transfers. This framework
1We acknowledge that potentially important behavioural effects are excluded from our analysis. A simple
way of providing a more comprehensiveanalysis of the various behavioural effects of an income tax reform is to
investigate the sensitivity of taxable income. Our empirical survey discusses the ﬁndings of the few papers that
have attempted such an analysis.
3is then generalized to allow for factors such as social welfare stigma, ﬁxed costs of partici-
pation to working, interactions between household members, rationing in the labour market,
the life-cycle context, and the demand side of the labour market. We also provide a short
discussion of micro-simulation models which are often used to evaluate the impact of tax and
transfer reforms. Section 3 discusses the two basic econometric approaches that are used to
estimate the parameters of labour supply functions: the Natural Experiment Approach and the
Structural Approach. Section 4 provides an analysis of the econometric results. We focus in
particular on two important tax reforms: the US Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and the
UK Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC). These reforms have been extensively studied by
economists in recent years. We also discuss a paper on the impact of the 1988 tax ﬂatten-
ing in Canada on taxable income. A survey of results from the structural approach is ﬁnally
presented. Section 5 presents some concluding remarks.
2 Theoretical framework
An assessment of the impact of public policies on labour supply requires economic models
to provide a context for comparison. Indeed, the manner in which the empirical analyses
are conducted is intimately linked to theoretical considerations. It is therefore important to
present a unifying framework in which the various empirical studies discussed in Section 4
can be compared.
2.1 The Basic Labour Supply Model
The most simple labour supply model is based on the static consumer theory. It assumes that
the individual has preferences over leisure (more accurately, nonmarket activities),
￿ , and over
consumption,
￿ . These preferences can be affected by a set
￿ of individual attributes such
as age, education and number of children. This set of characteristics allows the model to take
preference heterogeneity into account. Preferences can be represented by a standard utility
function. The individual’s exogenous hourly wage rate is
￿ and his exogenous nonwage in-
come is
￿ . The individual has a time endowment,








￿ , and his level of consumption. Note that this does not mean that he can choose
his hours of work with a single employer. The model can be thought of as characterizing a
situation where the individual chooses his hours of work by selecting across employers offer-
ing different hours packages. The individual’s budget constraint requires that his expenditures
cannot exceed the sum of his wage and nonwage income. Assuming no (positive or negative)










￿ . Finally, it is assumed that the individual chooses his hours of work and his
4consumption so as to maximize his utility subject to the budget constraint. Under standard as-
sumptions and assuming ﬁrst that the individual has strictly positive hours of work, his labour



















Moreover, the individual’s decision of working or not is obtained from a comparison be-
tween his reservation wage,
￿
#
" , and his actual wage rate,
￿ . His reservation wage is the wage


























  . The individual will decide to work
if his wage rate is larger than his reservation wage; otherwise, he will not work.
What does this model predict about the impact of a change in nonwage income,
￿ , and
wage rate,
￿ , on his desired hours of work ? If leisure is a normal good, the model predicts
that an increase in
￿ will reduce his labor supply (assuming the individual is a worker). More-
over, an increase in
￿ produces two opposite effects on his labour supply: a substitution effect
and an income effect. The substitution effect occurs because the wage rate is the opportunity
cost of leisure. Therefore, for a given real income, an increase in the wage rate will reduce
the demand for leisure, thereby increasing work incentives. The substitution effect thus has a
positive impact on labour supply. In contrast, the income effect is the result of the worker’s
enhanced real income after the wage increase. For a given level of hours of work, the individ-
ual has a greater command over resources than before. As a result, he will normally increase
his demand for leisure. The income effect of a wage increase thus reduces the worker’s labour
supply.
Because the actual labour supply response is the sum of the income and the substitution
effects, we cannot tell what the net impact of a wage increase will be; economic theory simply
does not tell us which effect is stronger. The answer depends on individual preferences. If the
income effect is dominant, the individual will respond to a wage increase by decreasing his
labour supply. However, when the substitution effect dominates, the actual response to a wage
increases will be to increase labour supply. Only an empirical analysis can ascertain the ﬁnal
outcome.
2.2 Taxation, Social Transfers and Labour Supply
Even though the basic model discussed above is the outcome of a wage increase, it can never-
theless provide useful insights into the impact of tax and transfer policies.
We ﬁrst turn to tax policies. A change in the rate at which income is taxed can easily be











































































Figure1: Impact ofatax cutonhoursof workinaproportionaltax system(caseof substitution
effect larger than income effect)
















  . A reduction
(increase) in
X is equivalent to an increase (reduction) in the net wage rate and its effect on
the individual’s labour supply will depend on the relative strengths of substitution and income







] ) on the individual’s hours of work. The straight lines correspond to
the budget constraints while the individual’s preferences are represented by the indifference
curves. Also the individual’s optimum choice is given by the tangency point between the
relevant budget line and the indifference curve. In Figure 1, it is assumed that the substitution
effect (S) is larger than the income effect (I). In that case, the net result (T) will be an increase




] . Note however that if the individual does not work, a reduction
in the tax rate might induce him to enter the labour market if his net wage rate becomes larger
than his reservation wage. Otherwise, the reduction will have no effect on the individual’s
decision to work.
This simple model can be seriously misleading since individuals seldom face a linear (pro-
portional) tax schedule. Rather, they are usually confronted to a progressive tax schedule.
Thus in Canada, the tax schedule is deﬁned by a limited number of linear segments relating
the income tax to the taxable income, and whose slopes are increasing with taxable income.
In turn, the individual’s budget constraint is deﬁned by a piecewise convex function which
relates his net-of-tax income to his hours of work.2
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Figure 2: Impact of a reduction in the lowest tax rate of a progressive system (case of substi-
tution effect larger than income effect))
With such a tax system, the individual’s desired hours of work will generally be a function
of all parameters of the tax schedule (including deductions, tax credits, marginal tax rates and
critical taxable income associated with changes in tax brackets). To illustrate, consider the
impact of a reduction in the lowest marginal tax rate,
X
f
r , in a progressive (convex) two-rate
tax system (see Figure 2). Now assume that an individual has taxable income such that his
marginal tax rate is at the upper end of the tax schedule. For this individual, the reduction in
X
f
r will simply reduce the level of income tax he has to pay without having any effect on his











  , where
X
f
t is his marginal tax rate). The change will









Note that this analysis supposes that the individual does not shift from one segment to another
of his budget constraint (no change in his marginal tax rate through a change in his hours of
work). On the other hand, consider a worker who faces the lowest marginal tax rate before
and after the policy. In his case, the reduction in
X
f
r , will produce a substitution and an income
effect that will affect his labour supply in opposite directions. (In Figure 2, it is assumed that









.) This analysis shows that the impact of a change in a parameter of the income tax
system on aggregate labour supply will depend, among other things, on how individuals are
distributed in the income scale.
The analysis is more complex when the individual shifts from one segment of his budget
constraint to another, after the change in the marginal tax. In this case, few general proposi-
ceilings on the payroll taxes paid by the worker.
7tions can be deduced about the effect of taxes on labour supply. We need “global” information
on the individual’spreferences, since local income and substitution effects are not sufﬁcient to
analyze the impact of the change. More precisely, the piecewise linear system must be deﬁned

























  of marginal wage rates and (virtual)













] ) corresponding to
changes in the tax brackets. Then, an optimization algorithm must be implemented to obtain
the individual’s desired hours of work (before and after the policy) that maximizes his utility
function subject to this segmented budget constraint (see Hausman (1985)). When the budget
constraint is convex(progressivity of the tax system), this algorithm is quite easy to implement
since any local optimum corresponds to a global optimum. At the empirical level, knowledge
of individual preferences (or the utility function) arises in the process of estimating the labour
supply function. Therefore, numerical computations of the effect of taxation on hours of work
can be carried out once the parameters of this function are estimated.
We also need to consider the impact of social transfers on the budget constraint. Many
transfers provided by governments are means-tested or income-related. This means that they
are targeted at poorer households. Also, some transfers play the role of work subsidies, that
is, their amount increases with the level of wage income (e.g., APPORT program in Qu´ ebec).
Clearly then, the individual’soverall budget constraint must also take into account these trans-
fers. These will depend, among other things, on the individual’s characteristics (e.g., his age,
the number of children and their age), on his wage rate and on the number of hours he works
on the labour market. In computing the tax schedule faced by a given individual, we must
take into account not only the marginal tax rates associated with the tax system but also those
related to the transfer programs. The latter indicate how beneﬁts change with each additional
dollar of earnings on the labour market. It is usually assumed that it is the cumulative (effec-
tive) marginal tax rates of all tax and transfer programs that affect labour supply behaviour
and not only those associated with the income tax system.
In the most simple cases, economic theory can shed some light on the impact of transfers
on labour supply. Assume for instance that a transfer program is deﬁned by two parameters:
a guaranteed level of income





. The latter deﬁnes the
rate at which transfers are reduced as total income increases up until the break-even point of
the program,
￿ , is reached. This parameter deﬁnes the minimum level of income at which
no beneﬁts are provided. Any additional hours worked beyond that point are paid at the wage
rate (net of the usual taxes, which, for simplicity, are assumed to be proportional to income).


















































$ . Note that the










































$ . This means
that the individual will receive a positive transfer from the government as long as his income














Figure 3: Impact of a decrease in the beneﬁt reduction rate of a transfer program on labour
supply (three possible cases)











, on the individual’s desired hours of work. That type of
reform has often been proposed in Canada to encourage social assistance recipients to work.
Three cases must be distinguished depending on the individual’spreferences and his wage rate
(see Figure 3). In the ﬁrst one, the individual does not work before the implementation of the
reform. In this case, the decrease in the beneﬁt reduction rate does encourage the individual to
enter the labour market. Whether he will work or not depends on whether his net wage rate is
higher than his reservation wage. In Figure 3, it is assumed that the former situation prevails.




w hours of work.
In the second case, the individual is not a program recipient before the reform (because his
wage income exceeds the break-even point). However, the decrease in the beneﬁt reduction
rate makes him eligible to beneﬁts since they are paid at higher levels of hours. In such a
case, both substitution and income effects will play in the same direction so as to decrease







). Finally, in the third case, the break-even point is still
lower than the individual’s income, even after the reform. Given the individual’s preferences










important conclusion of this analysis is that the global impact of the reform on labour supply
is theoretically ambiguous. How all these individual effects balance out will determine the
overall effectiveness of the policy with respect to its impact on aggregate hours of work.
The precedinganalysiscanalsobeextendedtotakeintoaccounttheprogressivetaxsystem
and the various payroll taxes. Basically the idea is to determine all the linear segments of
9the individual’s budget constraint associated with the tax and transfer programs and to use
an optimization algorithm to ﬁnd the individual’s optimal hours of work. Unfortunately, the
budget constraint is no longer convex when the transfer programs and vanishing tax credits
are considered. This is because the marginal tax rates are usually highest for low-income
individuals. In this case multiple local optima are possible. Therefore, we need to compare
the levels of utility associated with each local optima to determine the global optimum. It
can also be shown that nonconvex budget constraint generate discontinuous labour supply
functions (Hausman (1985)).
2.3 Extensions to the Theoretical Framework
2.3.1 Social Welfare Stigma
Up to now, we have implicitly assumed away social stigma associated with the participation in
a transfer program. However, it may be the case that receipt of social assistance is negatively
perceived. Social stigma is likely to reduce the individual’s welfare. For the recipient, a
dollar received from a social program may therefore be less desirable than a dollar received
from other sources (Mofﬁtt (1983), Hoynes (1996)). Moreover, social stigma may induce the
individual not to apply for beneﬁts even eligible. This may explain why the take-up rate of
programs such as Employment Insurance or Social Assistance are much lower than 100% (a
lack of information on the functioningof these programs may also be responsible). Finally, the
requirements to have access to social beneﬁts may vary from one program to another. Thus, to
receive disability insurance beneﬁts, a person must incur medical examinations, followed by
a positive recommendation from a doctor (Gruber (2000)). Moreover, this recommendation
must also be approved by the authorities of the program. Since the costs an individual must
bear to have access to beneﬁts may strongly vary across programs, their impact on individual
labour supply decisions may differ substantially.
2.3.2 Fixed Costs of Participation
Another consideration which may have an important impact on the budget constraint, es-
pecially for women’s labour force participation, is the presence of ﬁxed costs to working.
Transportation costs, child care fees, etc. all involve a ﬁxed cost element in the labour sup-
ply decisions. A direct consequence of these is to increase the individual’s reservation wage
(Cogan (1981)). Moreover, when entering the labor market, the individual will only consider
working at least a given minimum of hours of work so as to make-up for these ﬁxed costs.
This may explain why only a very small fraction of individuals are observed working less than
ﬁfteen hours per week. In turn, programs that provide child care subsidies have the effect of
10encouraging the labor force participation of wives and single parents with young children by
reducing their reservation wage. Note, however, that for those who worked in the labor market
before the introduction of the program, child care subsidies are equivalent to an income effect
that may reduce desired hours of work (Heckman (1974)).
2.3.3 Family Labour Supply
So far we have considered only individual labour supply. In fact many people live in house-
holds where there are more than one adult. Many people cohabit and it is quite likely that
their economic decision making is interdependent. For example, a husband and a wife may
make joint decisions concerning their labour supply, their domestic production and their con-
sumption of goods and services. Moreoverthe basic unit for many transfer programs is not the
individual but the household. This also complicates the analysis considerably. In that case, the
beneﬁt reduction rate faced by a wife who considers entering the labour market is the same as
the one faced by her husband if the household receives beneﬁt from the program.
Various approaches have recently been developed to allow for interactions between indi-
viduals within the household. The approach used in most empirical studies on labour supply
is based on a so-called recursive model. It is ﬁrst assumed that the husband is the “primary
decision maker”. He makes his labour supply decisions independently of his wife’s work de-
cisions. In particular, the wife’s individual income has no effect on his labour supply. On the
other hand, the wife is assumed to be a “secondary decision maker”. Her husband’s individual
income is therefore assumed to be a component of her nonwage income. In this approach,
an increase in the husband’s wage income reduces his wife’s labour supply though a negative
income effect. The main advantage of this traditional family approach lies in its simplicity.
In particular, it makes the estimation of the labour supply function for two-person households
almost as simple as for singles. Of course, one limitation of this model is that it does not take
into account the possibility of substitutability or complementarity between nonmarket time
of household members. Another approach, which allows for this possibility, is based on the
so-called unitary model. It assumes that the household behaves as if its members maximized
a standard household utility function subject to an household budget constraint. However,
most implications of this approach have received little empirical support. In particular, the
pooling restrictions – according to which only total nonwage income, and not its distribution
across household members, matters for labour supply decisions – have been strongly rejected
in many recent studies (Fortin and Lacroix (1997)). In contrast, a recent approach, referred
to as the collective model, only imposes that the outcomes of decisions within the household
are efﬁcient (Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (2002). However, to our knowledge, this model
has never been used to estimate the impact of tax and transfer programs on household labour
supply behaviour.
112.3.4 Rationing in the Labour Market
The framework discussed so far supposes that individuals can choose their desired number of
hours of work with no restrictions. This is clearly an unrealistic assumption. The observed
distribution of hours of work is the result of the interaction between the labour supplied by
workers and the labour demanded by ﬁrms. While an individual may want to work 33 hours
per week, there may be no job that offers this number of hours, at the given individual’s wage
rate. This type of constraints may however be introduced in the analysis by assuming that
the choice set faced by the individual is deﬁned by a discrete number of hours of work . The
individual’s wage rate may also vary with the level of these hours of work (Van Soest (1995)).
Thus, everythingbeingequal, full-timework oftenprovidesahigherhourlywagerateratethan
part-time work. Rationing in the labour market can also be taken into account by modeling
unemployment as a different state from non-participation.
2.3.5 Budget Constraint of the Public Sector
At the aggregate level, a complete model of the impact of tax and transfers programs must take
into account the budget constraint of the public sector and how policy instruments are adjusted
to satisfy this constraint. The model must also consider the impact of these adjustments on
individual labour supplies. Assume that the government decides to increase the guaranteed
income of a means-tested transfer program. The effect of this policy will crucially depend
on how this policy is funded. For instance, it could be funded by an increase in the beneﬁt
reduction rate of the program, by an increase in the marginal income taxes and/or by a reduc-
tion in other government expenditures (e.g., health, education). It is clear that the effect of the
policy on aggregate labour supply will vary according to which instrument is used to ﬁnance
the policy. When the marginal tax rates are increased, the negative income effect on the labour
supply of low-income persons who receive higher beneﬁts will be accompanied by a positive
income effect on the labour supply of high-income persons who pay higher taxes to fund the
policy. Therefore, the net income effect of the policy (and its funding) on aggregate labour
supply is ambiguous and is again an empirical issue. Furthermore, the model must take into
account the substitution effects associated with the increase in the marginal tax rates.
2.3.6 Multiperiod Models of Labour Supply
The approach we have presented until now is essentially static. However, many individuals
make their labour supply choices on the basis of a long term horizon. For instance, when they
are young, they might want to substitute education for labour supply; women might substitute
fertility for hours of work and some individuals might prefer to retire from the labour market
12early in their life cycle. Expectations of future wage changes or future tax and transfer policies
may also inﬂuence current labour supply decisions. Individual labour supply responses to
public policies may vary depending on whether the latter are expected to be permanent or
temporary.
Recent theoretical and empirical developments have attempted to replace the static view
of labour supply choices with a more dynamic approach. One basic idea is to analyze hours
of work decisions based on a dynamic optimization model rather than on a one-period ap-
proach. Under standard assumptions, individual choices can be analyzed using a two-stage
budgeting decomposition which is consistent with a life-cycle approach. In the ﬁrst stage,
the individual determines his allocation of wealth across periods. Second, within each period,
his optimization behaviour is solved using a standard static maximization problem. However,
the within-period individual’s nonwage income is now deﬁned as the difference between his
consumption expenditures and his wage income (Blundell and Walker (1986)).
2.3.7 The Demand Side of the Labour Market
Another limitation of our analysis thus far is that gross wage rates are assumed to be ex-
ogenous. In other words, they are not allowed to vary when the government introduces a new
transfer program or decides to make tax cuts. This issue is very important especially when one
wants to assess the effect of a major tax or transfer policy that is likely to induce a substantial
change in labour supply at the aggregate level. For instance, assume that the governmentintro-
duces an “in-work” transfer program to encourage low-income individuals to enter the labour
market. As long as the aggregate demand for these workers is highly inelastic with respect to
the wage rate, the effect of this policy may be to reduce the wage rate of low-skilled workers
without stimulating the creation of new jobs for these workers. In short, one will observe a
crowding-out effect in the labour market: those low-skilled individuals who ﬁnd a job will
simply replace other workers.
2.4 Microsimulation Models
The above discussion suggests the use of a “microsimulation” approach in order to examine
the impact of tax and transfer programs on labour supply. The essence of this approach is
to use survey evidence and consider various disaggregated groups of households (e.g., prime-
age males, wives with children, wives with no children, lone mothers). For each group, the
budget constraint is constructed based on existing tax and transfer programs. Also, the budget
constraint of the public sector is incorporated into the model. The latter can then be used to
simulate the impact of any tax and transfer policy on individual labour supplies and welfare
13(e.g., Blundell, Duncan and Meghir (1998). In more complete models, one also speciﬁes
which government instruments adjust to satisfy the government budget constraint. The model
requires a certain number of iterations to converge since changes in labour supply at each
iteration inﬂuence the level of tax receipts and transfer beneﬁts and therefore the value of the
instruments that must be chosen to satisfy the government budget constraint. This approach
has been used by Fortin, Truchon and Beaus´ ejour (1993) to analyze various reforms of the
welfare system in Quebec. Finally, one could also extend this approach to take the demand
side of the labour market into account within an applied general equilibrium model. This
would allow to consider the changes in the wage rates induced by tax and transfer policies as
well as the substitutions made by ﬁrms between various groups of workers.
3 Methodological Issues
Theprevioussectionhasunderlinedthepotential(theoretical)impactsassociatedwithchanges
in marginal tax rates and government transfers on labour supply. As mentioned there, because
theincomeandsubstitution effectsusuallyhaveoppositeimpactsandgiventheintricatenessof
the taxand transferprograms, one canseldom determinethe net impactof apolicyinitiativeon
labour supply, let alone the magnitude of the impact. Economists have thus spent considerable
efforts over the past twenty years to measure precisely the impact of policy changes on labour
supply. Given the complexity of the tax and transfer regimes and the nature of individual
decision-making, economists havedeviseddifferentstrategies to ascertainthe impact of policy
changes on behaviour. In what follows, we will brieﬂy discuss the two main strategies used in
empirical studies. We will then discuss the results from the most relevant studies.
3.1 The Natural Experiment Approach
In recent years the so-called Natural Experiment (NE) approach has been widely used in stud-
ies attempting to assess the impact of various government tax and transfer policies on individ-
ual behaviour. The policies that have been analyzed using this approach are varied and more
or less complex.
Traditionally, analysts have relied on “Before-After” comparisons of labour market out-
comes when assessing the impact of a particular policychangeon a givengroupof individuals.
As its name indicates, this estimator compares the outcomes of a given group at two separates
points in time.3 The validity of this estimator relies on relatively stringent assumptions. One
3Ideally, the contrast should be computed for the same individuals in both time periods. Yet it can be shown
thatundermildconditionsrepeated crosssectionaldatathatsamplethesamepopulationare sufﬁcienttoconstruct
14of them states that the only signiﬁcant change that has occurred is the policy change under
consideration. Changes in other policies or in the economic environment that affect the out-
comes are thus assumed away. In the event that such changes have occurred the before-after
estimate will be biased, and in some cases severely so. Given that behavioural adjustments to
new policies may take some time, this assumption is very unlikely to hold.
The NE approach – also known as the Difference-in-Difference approach – circumvents
the main caveat of the before-after approach by comparing the changes in the outcomes of
a group that was speciﬁcally targeted by the policy change with that of a group that was
not targeted or affected by the policy change. The former group is often referred to as the
“treatment group” in the literature, while the latter is often referred to as the “control group”.
Changes in observed outcomes of the control group may be attributed to ﬂuctuations in the
business cycle or to changes in policies not being investigated. By factoring out the measured
changes in the control group from the measured changes for the treatment group, one can
reasonably assume that the residual truly reﬂects the net impact of the policy change.
The fundamental assumption of the NE approach is that both the control and the treatment
groups are similarly affected by factors not considered explicitly in the analysis. This assump-
tion, while subject to criticism, probably is not as severe as those imposed by the traditional
before-after estimator. Yet, the main challenge of the NE approach is ﬁnding an acceptable
comparison group.
This comparison strategy is based on longitudinal data. It exploits the idea that a person
can be in both states at different times, and that outcomes measured in one state at one time
are good proxies for outcomes in the same states at other times. In other words, the outcomes
before the policy change are good proxies for outcomes that would have occurred had the
policy not been implemented.
3.2 The Microeconometric (Structural) Approach
One of the advantages of the NE approach is that, under plausible assumptions, it allows to
“locally” estimate some structural parameters of the labour supply function without having to
explicitly parameterize either the complex nonlinear budget constraint faced by the individual
or his utility function. The main drawback of this approach is its inability to infer potential
impacts of policy changes other than those considered in any given analysis. This drawback
arises because little formal structure is relied upon in deriving estimates of the impacts of
policy changes.
In contrast, the so-called “structural approach” purports to estimate all the preference pa-
a consistent before-after estimate.
15rameters and therefore provides global information which can be used to simulate the effect
of any reform on labour supply. In essence, the structural approach uses all the restrictions
imposed by economic theory to estimate the parameters of the model. A particular model
of labour supply behaviour is ﬁrst assumed based on an optimization program that considers
both individual preferences and budget constraints. Statistical assumptions are then made re-
garding the way in which the stochastic terms are introduced into the model. For example the
latter may reﬂect measurement errors, preference heterogeneity, or optimization errors. As-
sumptions are also made regarding the distribution of these stochastic terms (e.g., normality,
absence of correlation between regressors and these random terms). Of course, the complexity
of the estimation method (e.g., maximum likelihood methods, GMM, instrumental variables
(IV), non-parametric or semi-parametric approaches) depends on the complexity of the eco-
nomic model considered, on the functional form of the utility function, on the nature of the
budget constraint (e.g., piecewise linear constraint with ﬁxed costs of participation and with
hours rationing) and on the numerous assumptions concerning the distribution of the stochas-
tic terms. Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) provide step-by-step examples of econometric labour
supply models derived under various assumptions based on economic and statistical theories.
The structural methods used to estimate models of labour supply with tax and transfer
programs have been criticized on various grounds. First, some approaches assume that the
individual has a perfect knowledge of the parameters of all the tax and transfer programs that
inﬂuence his budget constraint. Of course, this requires a very high degree of information on
the part of the individual. Second, the approach requires that some variables such as education
be assumed to affect wage rates but not preferences, which is a rather strong assumption that is
not based upon economic theory. Third, given the complexity of the estimating methods used,
the functional form used to represent preferences often lacks ﬂexibility (e.g., linear labour
supply function), which may induce biases in the estimates. Finally, labour supply parameters
are often not very robust to the choice of the economic and statistical assumptions made to
estimate the model.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Results from the Natural Experiment Approach
As mentioned earlier, many recent studies rely on the NE approach to assess the impact of
tax reforms. We begin by reviewing evidence from two foreign tax programs, the US Earned
Income Tax Credit and the UK Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC), for three reasons. First,
both these programs exhibit similar features to the Canadian EarnedIncome Supplement (EIS)
and the Quebec APPORT program. Second, both the EITC and the WFTC have been exten-
16Table 1: Earned Income Tax Credit Parameters (1996)
Phase-In Phase-In Max Phase-Out Phase-Out
Rate Range Credit Rate Range
One child 34.0% $0-$6330 $2,152 15.98% $11,650-$25,078
Two children or more 40.0% $0-$8,890 $3,556 21.06% $11,650-$28,495
No children 7.65% $0-$4,220 $323 7.65% $5,280-$9,500
sively studied by economists in recent years. Third, most studies rely on the NE approach.
Following the discussion about the EITC and the WFTC, we will discuss other studies that
have looked at general tax reforms using the NE approach.
4.1.1 The US Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)
The EITC was begun in 1975 as a modest program aimed at offsetting the social security
payroll tax for low-income families with children. The program was expanded in 1986, 1990
and 1993. Taxpayer’s eligibility for the EITC depends on earned income (or in some cases
adjusted gross income), and the number of qualifying children who meet certain age, relation-
ship and residency tests. It is also required that the taxpayer have positive earned income that
is below a certain threshold ($28,495 in 1996). The credit is refundable so that a taxpayer with
no federal tax liability could receive a refund from the government for the full amount of the
credit. The parameters of the EITC are reported in Table 1 below.
The program includes three separate regions. The phase-in region transfers an amount
equal to the subsidy rate times earnings. In the ﬂat region, the family receives the maximum
credit. Finally, in the phase-out region the credit is clawed back at a given phase-out rate. For
example, a family with a single child and earnings between $6,330 and $11,650 will receive
the maximum credit of $2,152. Earnings beyond $11,650 are taxed back at the rate of 15.98%.
Once earnings reach $25,078 the family no longer receives any beneﬁt. The EITC program is
depicted in Figure 4 for an unmarried taxpayer. The ﬁgure shows how the introduction of the
EITC shifts the budget set of an otherwise untaxed individual from ADE to ABCDE.
From a policy perspective,the issue of interest is determining how such a shift may change
work incentives. As discussed in Section (2.2), the effect of such a program likely to be
ambiguous since it depends on the individual’s preferences and his/her wage rate. Notice ﬁrst
that the well-being of an individual that chooses not to work is unaffected by the EITC since
receiptisconditionalon positiveearnings(A).On the otherhand, somemayﬁnd theadditional
income accruing from the EITC worth entering the labour market. This will be the case if their










Figure 4: EITC Schedule
of the EITC thus has an unambiguous positive impact on labour force participation (segment
AB). Individuals in the ﬂat-range region (segment BC) have no incentives to increase their
hours of work. Quite to the contrary, for a given number of weekly hours of work, the EITC
has increased their income. If leisure is a normal good, they will by induced to consume
more of it, thereby decreasing their hours of work. Over the phase-out region, individuals face
relatively high implicit tax rates. Those that were already located between the C and D hours
thresholds may choose to reduce their hours of work. Finally, those that were located between
D and E may also choose to reduce their hours of work in order to beneﬁt from the tax credit.
All in all, the EITC has unambiguous positive work incentives only for individuals that
are out of the labour force. The incentive effects are more complicated for married couples.
Even the labour force participation effect is ambiguous. This occurs because the EITC is
based on family earnings. Indeed, to the extent that the husband is the primary decision maker
(see Section 2.3.3), the impact of the EITC on his decision to work is as described above. The
wife’sdecisiontoworkwill beconditionalonherhusband’sincome. Supposethatthehusband
earns $11,650 placing him at the beginning of the phase-out region. If the wife remains out
of the labour force, the family will receive the maximum beneﬁt. For each dollar she earns,
the family’s credit will be reduced by 21 cents (for a family with two children). She will also
have to pay social security taxes, state taxes, etc. Only if her husband earns very little income
will there be strong incentives for her to join the labour market.
The impact of EITC on hours of work and participation
18Several studies have attempted to measure the impact of the EITC on hours of work. Us-
ing standard elasticity estimates from the literature, Browning (1995) conducted simulations
that predicted that approximately half of the taxpayers in the phase-out region would reduce
their hours of work (see Section 2.4). Other studies have measured the impact of the EITC
directly [Dickert and Houser (1998), Scholtz (1996), Eissa and Liebman (1995) and Attanasio
and MaCurdy (1997)]. Eissa and Liebman (1995) examine the impact of recent EITC expan-
sions on female household heads using natural experiment methods that compare changes in
the labor force participation rates and hours worked of eligible (with children) and ineligible
(without children) women. They ﬁnd an increase in the rate of labour force participation,
but no evidence of a decline in hours worked by taxpayers in the phase-out region. Meyer
and Rosenbaum (2002) conﬁrm the participation result and further conclude that the EITC
explains over half of the substantial increases in the labor force participation of single women
with children over the past decade.
Attanasio and MaCurdy (1997) use the policydriven EITC changes overthe past decade to
estimate a life-cycle consistent model of household labor supply (see our discussion in Section
2.3.6). They estimate the EITC effects on couples in the labour market. Their results suggest
substantial effects of the credit expansion on hours worked. Unfortunately, their analysis does
not consider the participation decision.
More recently, Eissa and Hoynes (1999) have studied the response of married couples
to several EITC expansions over the period 1984-1996. Their results suggest that the EITC
expansions have caused married men’s labour force participation to increase only slightly but
have contributed to reduce women’s labour force participation by over a full percentage point.
This modest effect masks sizeable heterogeneity across individuals. Hence, women in the
phase-out region are more than 5% less likely to work, and if in the labour force, work as
much as 276 hours (20%) fewer hours per year.
The parameter estimates show that the elasticity with respect to the net-of-tax wage is
about 0.3 for women’s participation, and between 0.1 and 0.5 for their hours of work. The
authors also present evidence that hours of work elasticities for men and women are larger
for lower-earning individuals. Their overall assessment indicates that the EITC expansions
have led to reduced family labour supply and pre-tax family earnings. They are thus led to
conclude that the EITC is effectively subsidizing married mothers to stay home. In order to
offset the negative incentive effects of secondary earners, they suggest that the EITC be based
on individual rather than family earnings, although this would entail sizeable costs.
Inarecentpaper, MeyerandRosenbaum(2002)haveinvestigatedtheimpactofthewelfare
and tax policy changes that were enacted between 1984 and 1996. Their analysis allows them
to measure the contribution of several distinct policy changes to the observed unprecedented
increasein single mothers’employment andhours of work. The empiricalanalysis reveals that
both the participation in paid work as well as hours of work are highly sensitive to expansions
19in the EITC. In both cases the estimated elasticity with respect to the marginal tax rate is
approximately equal to 0.7. Likewise, the analysis also reveals that the increase in work by
single mothers also responded to welfare beneﬁt reductions, welfare waivers and child care
expansions, but to a lesser degree. The authors conclude that ﬁnancial incentives through the
tax and welfare systems have substantial effects on single mothers’ labour supply decisions.
4.1.2 The UK Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC)
An important component of the British tax and welfare system is the “in-work” beneﬁt pro-
gram called Family Credit (FC). Introduced in 1988 as an extension to Family Income Supple-
ment, it has many features in common with the EITC program in the US. However, eligibility
is based on a minimum weekly working hours requirement. The new Working Families Tax
Credit, which replaced FC in October 1999, has exactly the same minimum weekly hours re-
quirement. In this respect, the British in-work beneﬁt system has similarities to the Canadian
Self-Sufﬁciency Program.4 The FC system was designed to encourage part-time work and to
support the income of part-time working parents. It has subsequently been extended with a
small supplement for full-time work.
The basic FC scheme is generous but has a high beneﬁt reduction rate. Family Credit
becomes payable to individuals in families with children if their working hours exceed 16 per
week and their overall income falls below some speciﬁed level, which varies with the number
and age of children. The credit is then progressively withdrawn at a reduction rate of 70% as
income rises (lowered to 55% in the WFTC reform). This rate is considerably higher than that
for the EITC in the US (see Section 4.1.1).
Since the introduction of FC in 1988, the structure of the in-work beneﬁt system has wit-
nessed three major reforms: a reduction in the hours rule from 24 to 16 in 1992, the introduc-
tion of childcare disregards to help recipients with child-care costs in 1994, and the introduc-
tion of an additional credit at 30 hours. During this period, the number of recipients doubled
to well over 500,000. The Working Families Tax Credit reform only marginally changes the
structure with a more generous level of payment and a lower beneﬁt reduction rate of 55%.
Consequently, more individuals in work who would not have received FC will now receive
WFTC.
For most low-income individuals working less than 16 hours per week, the income support
and housing beneﬁt system renders the budget constraint virtually ﬂat, so that FC can act as an
important jump in the in-work income for low-wage working parents. The high beneﬁt reduc-
tion rate, however, implies a reasonably ﬂat constraint above 16 hours, providing a potentially
4However, it should be pointed out that the SSP, which is only currently operating on an experimental basis,
is time-limited and only available to parents with long durations of welfare receipt and unemployment.
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Figure 5: WFTC Schedule
strong incentivefor those workingmore to reduce their hours. Consequently,questions similar
to those of the EITC arise as to the effectiveness of the system.
The impact of the WFTC on hours of work and participation
Several research projects have been conducted recently at the Institute for Fiscal Studies
(IFS) to assess the likely impacts of the WFTC on the participation and hours of work of target
groups. The papers by Gregg, Johnson and Reed (1999), Blundell, Duncan, McCrae and
Meghir (2000) and Gillian, Walker and Zhu (1999) all use simulation techniques operating
on microeconomic data (see our discussion in Section 2.4). They differ both in terms of
methodology and in data sources. Yet, as shown in Table 2 below, all three studies yield
essentially the same results.
Indeed, the results show an unambiguous positive impact on the participation of single
mothers. There is also a sizeable positive impact on participation for married women with
unemployed partners. As would be expected, there is a moderate negative impact on married
women with employed partners. This partially offsets the positive impact on single women,
but if the aim is to reduce the number of families with no earners then this may be less impor-
tant. To this end, the impact on non-working married men with spouses who do not work is
equally interesting. Here again, there is a fairly large positive impact on employment. Finally,
for men with partners who do work, there is more disagreement across models - in fact, this
21Table 2: Predicted Impact of the WFTC
Group Gregg et al. Blundell et al. Gillian et al.
Number % Number % Number %
Single parents 28,600 1.85 34,000 2.20 24,700 1.60
Married women, partner
not working
14,610 1.75 11,000 1.32
Married women, partner
working
- 29,050 -0.83 -20,000 -0.57
Marriedmen, partner not
working
16,820 0.48 13,000 0.37
Married men, partner
working
1,790 0.05 -10,500 -0.30
Total employment effect 32,770 27,500
is essentially the main reason why the totals differ. For this group, the effect of an increase
in the wife’s income leads to a negative impact on participation in the study by Blundell et al.
(2000). The study by Gregg et al. (1999) does not ﬁnd a negative effect; however, this may be
because it only looks at entry into work and does not directly model exit from work. Hence,
it does not pick up the effect of previously employed men moving out of work in response to
the WFTC.
4.1.3 Evaluating Tax Reforms using the NE Approach
The previous subsections have focussed on the evaluation of particular provisions of the tax
system in the US and the UK. Here we will summarize the results of the empirical literature
that concentrates on the impact of various tax reforms on labour supply.
Tables 3–5 report the results of the main studies that have investigated various tax reforms
in the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada. Table 3 focuses on the US. All the pa-
pers listed in the table investigate the impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA). The TRA
reduced the top marginal tax rates signiﬁcantly. Some papers incorporate EITC expansions in
the analysis, others do not. Those that do not, manage to isolate the TRA from EITC effects
by choosing appropriate control and treatment groups, i.e. groups that were not affected by
EITC expansions.
The ﬁrst four papers look at the impact of the TRA on labour supply. It is found that the
labour supply of women reacted positively to the reduction in the marginal tax rates. This is
true for high-income married women [Eissa (1995)] and for female headed households [Eissa
and Liebman (1995) and Meyer and Rosenbaum (2002)]. Men, on the other hand, are found
22to be less responsive to the tax changes. Indeed, Eissa (1996) ﬁnd only weak evidence that
men increased their labour supply following changes in the marginal tax rates. Mofﬁtt and
Wilhelm (1998), on the other hand, investigate the behaviour of wealthy men. They ﬁnd
that high-income men have not responded to the reduction in top marginal tax rates. They
conjecture that since these men already work many hours, they may have little scope to adjust
their behaviour.
Recall from our discussion in the Introduction that hours of work is only one margin
against which to adjust behaviour in the face of changing ﬁscal provisions. Indeed, rising
tax rates may induce individuals to work in the underground sector or to modify their sav-
ings or portfolio decisions.5 The last three papers in Table 3 investigate how taxable income
changes as a result of changing marginal tax rates. Saez (1999), Feldstein (1995) and Gruber
and Saez (2000) all ﬁnd that individuals signiﬁcantly increase their taxable income when tax
rates are reduced. According to Saez (1999), both low-income and middle-income tax payers
increase their taxable income. The author suggests that these workers have little scope for
adjustment outside the labour market and is thus led to conclude that increased hours of work
are the main driving factor behind increasing revenues. Feldstein (1995), on the other hand,
ﬁnds taxable income to be extremely sensitiveto variations in marginal tax rates. The reported
elasticities range between 0 and 3. It is clear that such variations in taxable income cannot be
explained by variations in hours of work alone. Other adjustments are taking place. Feld-
stein further warns that his results represent short-run adjustments to variations in marginal
tax rates. The long-run response is likely greater. Thus when interpreted in light of Mofﬁtt
and Wilhelm (1998)’s results, Feldstein’s results imply that increasing the top marginal tax
rates will yield few if any additional tax revenues for the government. The results reported in
Gruber and Saez (2000) are consistent with those of Feldstein (1995) but the elasticities are
somewhat smaller.
Table 4 reports the results of two studies that were conducted using UK data. In the ﬁrst of
these, Blundell et al. (1998) investigate the impact of the various tax reforms that were carried
out through the 1980s and early 1990s on married women’s labour supply. The elasticities
reported in this study do not distinguish between participation per se and annual hours of
work. All the net wage elasticities are found to be positive and to vary according to the age of
the youngest child. Interestingly, it is found that the elasticities are highest when the youngest
child is a preschooler.
The other study listed in the table focuses on lone mothers. In their paper, Blundell,
Duncan and Meghir (1992) report labour supply elasticities according to hours of work and
schooling levels. As in their 1998 paper, they ﬁnd that women with preschoolers are more
sensitive than others to variations in net wage rates. Likewise, women working few hours are
more responsive to increases in their net wage than those working more hours. In fact, women
5Veal (2001) has recently investigated the impact of the 1988 tax ﬂattening in Canada on RRSP contributions.
23working many hours are found to have a backward-bending labour supply curve. In other
words, increases in the net wage rate translates into fewer hours of work. This is an indication
that the income effect is greater than the substitution effect.
Finally, Table 5 reports the results of a study by Sillamaa and Veall (2000) that uses Cana-
dian data. This study is similar to those conducted by Mofﬁtt and Wilhelm (1998) and Feld-
stein (1995). The authors use tax records from the Longitudinal Administrative Database
(LAD) for the years 1986–1989 to study the impact of the 1988 tax ﬂattening in Canada. As
stressed by the authors, we know fairly little about the impact of tax reforms in Canada. Yet,
the responsiveness to tax changes is important in determining the social marginal cost per
dollar revenue raised through the tax system.6
Unfortunately, the LAD contains no information on hours of work. The authors therefore
seek to investigate the response of taxable income to the 1988 tax ﬂattening. The authors
report the impact of the tax ﬂattening on various measures of income. The ﬁrst row of the
table show that a 1% reduction in the marginal tax rate increase gross income by 0.25%.
Income accruing from regular employment and self-employment is much more sensitive, with
an elasticity nearly equal to 1. When reported separately, income from regular employment
has an elasticity of about 0.22 and the elasticity of income from self-employment is as high
as 1.23. The elasticity of income from regular employment is similar to elasticities usually
reported for annual hours of work.
The second row of the table reports elasticities of individuals that were at least 64 years
of age in 1986. The senior population is singled out because the option of retiring or reduc-
ing hours of work signiﬁcantly is presumably more likely. The estimate for regular income
(1.764) suggests indeed that when faced with higher marginal tax rates, seniors will respond
by decreasing considerably their labour supply. The response of self-employment income,
though sizeable at 0.637, is less than that found for the total population.
Finally,theauthorsinvestigatetheresponsivenessofhigh-incomeindividualstotaxchanges.
Unfortunately, only the response of gross income is reported in the paper. Nevertheless, the
elasticities indicate that increases in the marginal tax rates will be more than compensated for
by reductions in gross income, except perhaps for married women. These elasticities are of
the same order of magnitude as those reported using US data.
6Fortin and Lacroix (1994) estimate the marginal social cost of an additional tax dollar to be approximately
equal to $1.55 in Qu´ ebec when labour supply in both the regular and the underground sectors are taken into
account.
244.2 Results from the Microeconometric (Structural) Approach
4.2.1 Standard Labour Supply Studies
As mentioned in Section 3.2, the so-called structural approach exploits the institutional de-
tails of the tax regimes to model individual behaviour. The main beneﬁt of this approach is
its ability to simulate precisely the response to changes in tax regimes on an individual basis.
Given the complexity of the tax regimes and the ensuing methodological challenges, all stud-
ies most rely on simplifying assumptions. These can relate to the details of the tax regimes
per se and/or to statistical assumptions. Microeconometric studies could thus be categorized
according to the postulated assumptions. Instead, we have chosen to categorize them accord-
ing to the country under investigation. The technical details are thus willingly omitted from
the discussion. Given the robustness of the results observed in the literature, we feel there is
no need to spend much time on this issue.
Tables 6 and 7 report results for men and married women separately. Fewer studies are
devoted to studying men’s behaviour. Indeed, men’s labour supply is usually thought not to be
very responsiveto changes in tax rates. In fact, most results presented in Table 6 are consistent
with this presumption. The net wage elasticity of hours of work ranges between 0 and 0.25.
The only noteworthy exception in the table is the study by Lacroix and Fortin (1992) using
Canadian data. In their 1992 paper, they study the impact of marginal tax rates on hours of
work in the regular and irregular (underground) labour markets. The fact that their elasticities
are higher than those of other studies is the consequence of allowing for an additional margin
of adjustment (irregular labour) in the analysis. No other study allows for such adjustment
due to the lack of appropriate data. The elasticity of regular hours for individuals working in
the regular market only, 0.249, is close to those found in other studies. On the other hand,
individuals working in both sectors are much more sensitive to variations either in the regular
wage (RW) and the irregular wage (IW). In a study that used Census data, and in which
irregular hours are not allowed for, Fortin and Lacroix (1997) ﬁnd elasticities very much in
linewiththosefoundinothercountries. It issafetoconcludethatmen’shoursofwork respond
little to changes in net wage rates. On the other hand, they are relatively sensitive to changes
in nonwage income. The reported elasticities are negative as expected, and relatively high in
some cases.
Women’s elasticities are reported in Table 7. A quick glance through the table shows that
women’selasticitiesare muchhigherthanthoseofmen, irrespectiveofthe countryconsidered.
In nearly all cases, the elasticities are positive. The only noteworthy exceptions are the studies
by Robinson and Tomes (1985) and Nakamura and Nakamura (1981), both using Canadian
data. It is not clear why these two studies yield different results. On the other hand, the studies
by Stelcner and Breslaw (1985), Smith and Stelcner (1985), Lacroix and Fr´ echette (1994) and
25Fortin and Lacroix (1997) all use samples of women from Qu´ ebec for different years. Yet,
they all yield very similar results.
4.2.2 Labour Supply and Child Care
Recall from Section 2.3.2 that ﬁxed costs of work increase an individual’s reservation wage.
A consequence of ﬁxed costs is also to induce individuals to work a minimum number of
hours so as to absorb these additional costs. Research into the impact of child care cost on
women’s labour supply has been very active in recent years. Table 8 reports results for Canada
and the US. Both Canadian studies use data from the Canadian National Child Care Survey
to investigate the sensitivity of women’s hours of work with respect to child care costs. Both
studies ﬁnd negative and relatively high elasticities of participation and hours of work with
respect to child care costs. Interestingly, Cleveland, Gunderson and Hyatt (1996)’s paper
shows that an increase in father’s wage translates into additional expenditures on market care.
The US studies yield very similar results to those found in Canada. The study by the
Government Accounting Ofﬁce (1994) reports results based on broad income groups. The
results show that poor households are much more responsive to increase in child care cost
than non-poor households. Hence, a 10% increase in child care costs will induce 5% of poor
households to leave the labour market. The study by Anderson and Levine (1999) offers
very interesting insights into the sensitivity of women’s labour supply decision with respect
to child care costs. Their results are classiﬁed ﬁrst according to schooling levels, then by
income and schooling levels. Their results show that those who are poorly educated are much
more responsive to variations in wage rates and child care costs when deciding to participate
in the labour market. Likewise, poor and near-poor households react much more strongly to
increases in child-care costs. These results suggest that policies that provide support for child
care costs will beneﬁt poor, low-educated households most.
5 Conclusion
The inﬂuence of governmental tax and transfer programs on individual behaviour is often a
critical consideration in the design of policies. Changes in any single policy parameter can
potentially affect a whole array of decisions including, but not restricted to, labour supply,
work in the underground economy, savings, human capital investments, etc.
This report has focused exclusively on labour supply responses to policy changes for three
reasons. First, recent reforms of tax and transfer programsoften aim at increasing employment
and hours work of targeted groups. Second, labour resources represent the most important
26input into the production of goods and services in the economy. Third, hours of work and
labour force participation are easily measured and are well understood concepts.
Section 2 has reviewed the main theoretical tools that are necessary to understand the bulk
of published empirical studies in the economics literature. Section 3 presented the two main
empirical strategies used when assessing the impact of policy reforms. Finally, Section 4 has
surveyed the most recent empirical evidence on labour supply response to changes in policy
parameters.
Our overall assessment of the vast literature on labour supply is threefold. First, from a
methodological point of view, it seems quite clear that most recent empirical studies have
favoured the so-called difference-in-differences or natural experiment approach. This ap-
proach has many virtues, one of them being its simplicity. Unfortunately, many analysts tend
to overlook the stringent assumptions that are implicitly required to obtain consistent impact
estimates. From a policy perspective, this approach is also of limited use since it does not pro-
vide sufﬁcient information for extrapolation to, or simulation of, alternative policy changes.
Microeconometric structural models are better equipped to simulate tax and welfare policy
changes. On the other hand, estimation of a structural model that embodies complex tax and
transfer programs can be daunting and require strong identifying restrictions.
Second, acarefulreading ofthe empiricalliterature revealsthatmuchof women’sresponse
to policyinitiativesoccurs through theextensive(participation) margin. Two importantstudies
(Eissa (1995), Eissa and Liebman (1995)) have thus established that both married women and
single mothers are less responsive to policy changes at the extensive margin. The latter study
has also found that the signiﬁcant changes that had been made to the EITC with the passage
of the 1986 Tax Reform Act had no impact on the hours of work of single mothers already in
employment.7 This result has profound implications for the efﬁciency-equity trade-off under-
7In a recent paper, Meyer (2002) provides empirical evidence that the EITC unequivocally encouraged single
parents to work, while having little or no effect on the hours of work patterns of those already in employment. In
a relatively recent paper, Kimmel and Kniesner (1998) provide strong econometric evidence that the elasticities
of labour supply differ substantially at the extensive and the intensive margins. We have not surveyed their study
since the analysis does not account for income taxes. Nevertheless, their results are worth underlining. The table
below reports the main elasticities from their paper.
Estimated Labour Supply Wage Elasticities
Single Married Single Married
Men Men Women Women
Employed 0.65 1.08 2.42 1.85
Hours 0.44 0.40 0.69 0.67
These results show that there are no differences by marital status in the elasticities of hours worked by the
employed, but signiﬁcant differences by marital status in the wage elasticities of employmentas expected if ﬁxed
money costs of employment are important. The sex/marital status differences in employment elasticities are
consistent with family ﬁxed costs of employment falling largely on the wife in married families.
27lying any policy reform. Models and simulations that do not acknowledge unresponsiveness
of labour supply at the intensive (hours) margin are likely to overstate the labour supply disin-
centives effects of many transfer programs. On the other hand, many studies have found that
taxable income is much more responsive to tax changes than hours of work. This is observed
both in the U.S. (Mofﬁtt and Wilhelm (1998), Saez (1999), Feldstein (1995), Gruber and Saez
(2000)) and in Canada (Sillamaa and Veall (2000)). In particular, high income taxpayers are
always found to be very sensitive to increases in marginal tax rates. These results raise a
fundamental policy dilemma: policies or programs that favour labour market participation are
costly from the government’s point of view. In order to satisfy its budget constraint, additional
taxes must be levied against some taxpayers. According to these studies, the government’s
ability to increase tax income accruing from high income taxpayers appears to be somewhat
limited.
Thirdly, studies that use Canadian data to assess the impact of tax and transfers programs
in a methodologically sound manner are despairingly few. Indeed, the main labour supply
surveys that have been published over the past two decades include only two or three studies
that use Canadian data. Discussions of policy reforms in Canada are thus based on evidence
from other countries which may or may not be relevant given institutional and behavioural
differences. Research efforts should thus be devoted to ﬁll this important gap and to enlighten
policy discussions.
28References
Anderson, P., and P. B. Levine (1999) ‘Child care and mothers’ employment decisions.’
NBER WP #7058
Arellano, M., and C. Meghir (1992) ‘Female labour supply and on-the-job search: An
empirical model estimated using complementary data sets.’ Review of Economic Studies
59, 537–559
Arrufat, J. L., and A. Zabalza (1986) ‘Female labour supply with taxation, random
preferences and optimization errors.’ Econometrica 54, 47–63
Attanasio, O., and T. MaCurdy (1997) ‘Interactions in family labor supply and their
implications for the impact of the EITC.’ Mimeo, Standford University
Averett, S.L., E. Peters, and D. Waldman (1997) ‘Tax credits, labor supply and child care.’
Review of Economics and Statistics 79(1), 125–135
Blau, D., and P. K. Robins (1988) ‘Child care costs and family labor supply.’ Review of
Economics and Statistics
Blomquist, N. S. (1983) ‘The effect of income taxation on the labor supply of married men in
Sweden.’ Journal of Public Economics 22(2), 169–197
Blomquist, S., and U. Hansson-Bruseuitz (1990) ‘The effects of taxes on male and female
labor supply in Sweden.’ Journal of Human Resources 25(3), 317–357
Blundell, R., A. Duncan, and C. Meghir (1992) ‘Taxation in empirical labour supply models :
Lone mothers in the uk.’ Economic Journa 102, 265–278
Blundell, R., A. Duncan, and C. Meghir (1998) ‘Estimating labor supply responses using tax
reforms.’ Econometrica
Blundell, R., A. Duncan, J. McCrae, and C. Meghir (2000) ‘The labour market impact of the
WFTC.’ Fiscal Studies 21(1), 75–104
Blundell, R., and T. MaCurdy (1999) ‘Labor supply : a review of alternative approaches.’ In
Handbook of Labor Economics, ed. Ashenfelter and D. Card, vol. Vol. 3A pp. 1559–1695
Blundell, R. W., and I. Walker (1986) ‘Modelling the joint determination of household labour
supplies using cross section data.’ Review of Economic Studies 53, 539–558
Blundell, R. W., C. Meghir, E. Symons, and I. Walker (1988) ‘Labour supply speciﬁcation
and the evaluation of tax reforms.’ Journal of Public Economics 36, 23–52
Bourguignon, F., and T. Magnac (1990) ‘Labor supply and taxation in France.’ Journal of
Human Resources 25(3), 358–389
Browning, E. (1995) ‘Effects of the earned income tax credit on income and welfare.’
National Tax Journal 6(1), 3–25
Chiappori, P.-A., B. Fortin, and G. Lacroix (2002) ‘Marriage market, divorce legislation and
household labor supply.’ Journal of Political Economy 110(1), 37–72
Christoﬁdes, L. N., T. Stengos, and R. Swidinsky (1997) ‘Welfare participation and labour
market behaviour in canada.’ Canadian Journal of Economics 30, 595–621
Cleveland, G., M. Gunderson, and D. Hyatt (1996) ‘Child care costs and the employment
29decision of women: Canadian evidence.’ Canadian Journal of Economics 29(1), 132–151
Cogan, J.F. (1981) ‘Fixed costs and labor supply.’ Econometrica 4, 945–963
Colombino, U., and D. Del Boca (1990) ‘The effect of taxes on labor supply in Italy.’ Journal
of Human Resources 25(3), 390–414
Connelly, R. (1992) ‘The effects of child care costs on married women’s labor force
participation.’ Review of Economics and Statistics
Dagsvik, J.K., F. Laisney, S. Strom, and J. Ostervold (1988) ‘Female labour supply and the
tax beneﬁt system in France.’ Annales d’ ´ Economie et de Statistiques 30, 5–39
Dickert, S, and S. Houser (1998) ‘Taxes and transfers: A new look at the marriage penalty.’
National Tax Journal
Eissa, N. (1995) ‘Taxation and labor supply of married women : The tra of 1986 as a natural
experiment.’ NBER WP #5023
(1996) ‘Labor supply and the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981.’ In Empirical
Foundations of the Household Taxation, ed. M. Feldstein and J. Poterba Conference
Volume (NBER, Cambridge, MA)
Eissa, N., and H.W. Hoynes (1999) ‘The EITC and the labor supply of married couples.’
Institute for Research on Poverty WP #99
Eissa, N., and J.B. Liebman (1995) ‘Labor supply response to the earned income tax credit.’
NBER WP #5158
Feldstein, M. (1995) ‘The effects of marginal tax rates on taxable income: A panel study of
the 1986 Tax Reform Act.’ Journal of Political Economy 103, 551–572
Flood, L., and T. MaCurdy (1993) ‘Work disincentives effects of taxes : An empirical
analysis of Swedish men.’ Mimeo, Standford University
Fortin, B., and G. Lacroix (1994) ‘The marginal cost of public funds in the presence of an
irregular sector : An empirical investigation.’ Journal of Public Economics 55(3), 407–431
(1997) ‘A test of the neoclassical and collective models of household laour supply.’
Economic Journal 107, 933–955
Fortin, B., M. Truchon, and L. Beaus´ ejour (1993) ‘On reforming the welfare system :
Workfare meets the negative income tax.’ Journal of Public Economics 51(2), 119–151
Gelbach, J. (1997) ‘How large an effet do child care costs have on single mothers’ labor
supply? evidence using access to free public schooling.’ MIT
Gillian, P., I Walker, and Y. Zhu (1999) ‘Child support reform: Some analysis of the 1999
white paper.’ Mimeo, Institute for Fiscal Studies
Gregg, P., P. Johnson, and H. Reed (1999) ‘Entering work and the British tax and beneﬁts
system.’ IFS Monograph
Gruber, J. (2000) ‘Disability insurance beneﬁts and labor supply.’ Journal of Political
Economy 108(6), 1162–1183
Gruber, J., and E. Saez (2000) ‘The elastiticy of taxabal income: Evidence and implications.’
NBER WP #7512
Han, W-J, and J. Waldfogel (1998) ‘Child care and women’s employment.’ Unpublished
30Manuscript, Columbia University School of Social Work
Hausman, J. (1985) ‘The econometrics of nonlinear budget sets.’ Econometrica
6(53), 1255–1282
‘Labor supply.’ In How Taxes Affect Economic Behaviour, ed. H. J. Harron and J. A.
Pechman (The Brookings Institution, Washington)
Heckman, J. (1974) ‘Shadow prices, market wages and labor supply.’ Econometrica
42(4), 679–694
Hoynes, H. (1996) ‘Welfare transfers in two-parent families: Labor supply and welfare
participation under AFDC-UP.’ Econometrica 64(2), 295–332
Kaiser, H., U. van Essen, and P.B. Spahn (1992) ‘Income taxation and the supply of labour in
West Germany.’ Jahrbucher fur Nationalokonomie und Statistik 209, 87–105
Kimmel, J. (1988) ‘Child care costs as a barrier to employment for single and married
mothers.’ Review of Economics and Statistics 80(2), 287–299
Kimmel, J., and T. J. Kniesner (1998) ‘New evidence on labor supply: Employment versus
hours elasticities by sex and marital status.’ Journal of Monetary Economics
42(2), 289–301
Lacroix, G., and B. Fortin (1992) ‘Utility-based estimation of labour supply functions in the
regular and irregular sectors.’ Economic Journal 102(415), 1407–1422
Lacroix, G., and P. Fr´ echette (1994) ‘A model of female labour supply in the presence of
unemployment and underemployment.’ Annales d’ ´ Economie et de Statistiques
36, 113–131
MaCurdy, T., D. Green, and H. Paarsch (1990) ‘Assessing empirical approaches for
analyzing tax and labour supply.’ Journal of Human Resources 25, 415–490
Meyer, B. D. (2002) ‘Labor supply at the extensive and intensive margins: The EITC,
welfare and hours of work.’ Mimeo, Northwestern University
Meyer, B. D., and D. T. Rosenbaum (2002) ‘Welfare, the earned income tax credit, and the
labor supply of single mothers.’ NBER WP #7363
Michalopoulos, C., P. K. Robins, and I. Garﬁnkel (1992) ‘A structural model of labor supply
and child care demand.’ Journal of Human Resources 27(1), 166–203
Mofﬁtt, R. A., and M. Wilhelm (1998) ‘Taxation and the labor supply decisions of the
afﬂuent.’ NBER WP # 6621
Mofﬁtt, R.A. (1983) ‘An economic model of welfare stigma.’ American Economic Review
73(5), 1023–1035
Nakamura, A., and M. Nakamura (1981) ‘A comparison of the labor force behavior of
married women in the United-States and Canada, with special attention to the impact of
income taxes.’ Econometrica 49(2), 451–489
Powell, L. M. (1997) ‘The impact of child care costs on the labour supply of married
mothers: Evidence from Canada.’ Canadian Journal of Economics 30(3), 575–594
(2002) ‘Joint labor supply and children choice decisions of married mothers.’ Journal of
Human Resources 37(1), 106–128
31Ribar, D. (1995) ‘A structural model of child care and labor supply of married women.’
Journal of Labor Economics
Robinson, C., and N. Tomes (1985) ‘More on the labour supply of canadian women.’
Canadian Journal of Economics 15(4), 706–734
Saez, E. (1999) ‘The effect of marginal tax rates in income: A panel study of ”bracket
creep”.’ NBER WP #7367
Scholtz, J. K. (1996) ‘In-work beneﬁts in the United States : The earned income tax credit.’
Economic Journal 106, 156–169
Sillamaa, M.-A., and M.R. Veall (2000) ‘The effect of marginal tax rates on taxable income :
A panel study of the 1988 tax ﬂattening in Canada.’ SEDAP Research Paper # 25
Smith, J. B., and M. Stelcner (1985) ‘Labour supply of married women in canada.’ Canadian
Journal of Economics 21(4), 857–870
Stelcner, M., and J. Breslaw (1985) ‘Income taxes and the labour supply of married women
in quebec.’ Southern Economic Journal 51(4), 1053–1072
Triest, R. K. (1990) ‘The effect of income taxation on labor supply in the United States.’
Journal of Human Resources 25(3), 491–516
United States General Accounting Ofﬁce (1994) ‘Child care subsidies increase likelihood
that low-income mothers will work.’ Technical Report
Van Soest, A. (1995) ‘Structural models of family labor supply: A discrete choice approach.’
Journal of Human Resources 30, 63–88
Van Soest, A., I. Woittiez, and A. Kapteyn (1990) ‘Labour supply, income taxes and hours
restrictions in the Netherlands.’ Journal of Human Resources 25, 517–558









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































)Table 6: Non-linear budget constraints, cross-sectional data, Men
Study Data Results
Wage elasticity Income elasticity
CANADA
Lacroix and Fortin (1992)
￿
Enquˆ ete sur la ﬁscalit´ e au Qu´ ebec Regular Labour Market, only
0.249 -0.054









Fortin and Lacroix (1997) 1986 census data 0.223 -0.054
UNITED STATES
Hausman (n.d.) US Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 1975 [0.00,0.03] [-0.95, -1.03]
MaCurdy, Green and
Paarsch (1990)
US Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 1975 0 -0.01
Triest (1990) US Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 1983 0.05 0
SWEDEN
Blomquist (1983) Swedish Level of Living Survey, 1974 0.08 [-0.04, -0.03]
Blomquist and Hansson-
Bruseuitz (1990)
Swedish Level of Living Survey, 1981 [0.08, 0.13] [-0.01,-0.008]
Flood and MaCurdy
(1993)
Swedish Household Market and Non-market
Survey, 1984
[0.04, 0.25] [-0.1, -0.07]
NETHERLANDS
Van Soest, Woittiez and
Kapteyn (1990)




Kaiser, van Essen and
Spahn (1992)








British Family Expenditure Survey, 1980 0.024 -0.287
￿
No distinction between men and women.Table 7: Non-linear budget constraints, cross-sectional data, Married Women
￿
Study Data Results
Wage elasticity Income elasticity
CANADA
Robinson and Tomes (1985) Quality of Life Survey, 1979 [-0.23, -0.20] 0








Stelcner and Breslaw (1985) 1981 census data 0.40 -0.09
Smith and Stelcner (1985) 1981 census data [Age Group]
[20–34] 0.149 -0.184
[35–54] 0.028 -0.077






Lacroix and Fr´ echette (1994) Enquˆ ete sur la ﬁscalit´ e au Qu´ ebec 0.469 -0.170
Fortin and Lacroix (1997) 1986 census data 0.458 -0.015
UNITED STATES
Hausman (n.d.) US Panel Study of Income Dynam-
ics, 1975
0.995 -0.121


















Bourguignon and Magnac (1990) French Labour Force Survey, 1985 [0.05, 1.0] [-0.3,-0.2]
Dagsvik, Laisney, Strom and Oster-
vold (1988)




Arellano and Meghir (1992) British Family Expenditure Survey,
1983 and British Labour Force Sur-
vey, 1983
[0.29,0.71] [-0.40, -0.13]
Arrufat and Zabalza (1986) British General Household Survey,
1981
2.03 -0.2
Blundell, Meghir, Symons and
Walker (1988)




Colombino and Boca (1990) Turin Survey of Couples, 1979 [0.66, 1.18] 0.52
Unless otherwise stated.T
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